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The innovative performance of 1,200 representative firms in the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic was analyzed. The study differentiates between product 
innovation and three different forms of process innovations. This data was joined to the quality of 
societal institutions of the country containing the firms. Results show that institutional quality is 
correlated with the innovative performance of firms through different channels.  
With respect to product innovations, institutional quality exhibits mediate effects through financing of 
R&D and the design of the organizational structure, with larger technical / R&D departments being 
found in firms in environments of high societal quality.  
However when investigating process innovations, the pattern is surprisingly different: firms located in 
European countries with a relatively low score regarding institutional quality, develop predominantly 
more process innovations. We speculate that this is the result of the characteristics of competition in 
countries with a relatively poor quality of institutions.  
With regard to industrial sector, the data reveals that firms in the wholesale and trade areas follow 
quite different patterns compared to firms involved in manufacturing/production. Manufacturing firms 
make predominantly product innovations and these are often financed by external sources, whereas 
firms in wholesale and trade make more process innovations and these tend to be financed by internal 
sources.  
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Introduction 
In recent years, more and more scholars argue that empirical research performed previously in the 
field of innovation management is insufficient both from a theoretical perspective as also for gaining 
practical insight. One possible factor is the metrics used to measure innovative performance (e.g. 
Autio et al 2014, Kerr & Nanda, 2015, p. 457), for example, one commonly-used indicator of 
innovative performance is number of patents, however this metric has several flaws: Firstly patents 
are just an indicator for innovations and do not prove much beyond this i.e. they may be patents meant 
to block others. Secondly, especially SMEs avoid patenting their innovations in order to avoid the 
efforts of filing a patent and the expense of legally contesting or defending their patents. Thirdly, 
while product innovations can be protected by patents, it is quite difficult to patent process 
innovations and innovators may fall back on e.g. trade secrets, indeed Piening and Salge (2015) argue 
that research on specifically process innovations remains underdeveloped due to these kinds of issues. 
In addition to issues with common metrics, the field of innovation management seldom considers 
societal institutions (see; Ahmadjian, 2016, Crossan & Apaydin, 2010 pp. 1177-1178, Oliver, 1997, 
Peng et al., 2009, as well as Tylecote, 2007). According to this view, innovative performance is not 
just the consequence of a well-designed corporate strategy combined with innovative employees, but 
it also depends on the societal context that creates the environment for innovative behavior and an 
appropriate management. Knetter (1989) raises the question if firms (as social structures that have 
attained a high degree of resilience), achieve this by imitating the norms of the state to achieve 
"appropriate" behaviour? Clearly organizational adaptations to various societal contexts can be quite 
different, but nevertheless there could be some organizational patterns that are more successful - or 
more widely successful - than others in this respect.   
In this paper, we present a general structural equation model (SEM) that analyses the innovative 
performance of European firms in the industry regarding product and process innovations. The data 
sources allow us to finely differentiate process innovations into innovations for producing, logistics 
and internal services. This approach also allows us to consider the societal environment of the 
countries where the firms are located. We focus on the regulatory quality because as institutional 
economists highlight (e.g. North, 1990, North, 2009, and North et al., 2009) this factor is a central 
parameter for economic development. Our approach also considers economic constraints and how 
firms finance their innovations, as well as pinpointing where this is in the organizational structure 
(e.g. the relative size of central organizational units) because different units play various important 
roles in creating innovations and the societal environment influences the size of these units. Finally, 
we investigate different industries and reveal that the existing literature (with its strong focus on 
manufacturers and product innovations) shows a blind spot, meaning that companies from other 
industries should be cautious when applying the lessons derived from findings on product-
innovations, because both process innovations and other industries are quite different.    
The paper is organized as follows: In the first section, we summarize the ongoing debate in the field 
of innovation management that goes beyond patents and product innovations and here we highlight 
why the field might benefit by considering institutional approaches. In the second section, we present 
our dataset and our general SEM. The third part of the paper presents the findings of our empirical 
approach. As we highlight, institutional quality influences the innovative performance of firms 
through different channels. Regarding product innovations, institutional quality has mediate effects 
through financing of R&D and the design of the organizational structure. Considering process 
innovations, the pattern is surprising: firms located in European countries with (relatively) poor 
institutions develop more process innovations. We explain this surprising finding through the 
characteristics of competition in countries with (relatively) poor institutions. Furthermore, industry 
sector matters too, and our findings reveal that firms in the wholesale and trade business follow quite 
different patterns compared to firms from industries involving production. Finally, we discuss our 
findings and highlight areas for further research and practitioners.  
 
Process and Product Innovations, Societal Institutions and Financing 
Explaining the innovative performance of firms remains a major goal of academic research but in 
recent years academic opinion tends to imply that the previous theoretical and empirical approaches 
are too narrow. For example, Crossan & Apaydin (2010, pp. 1177-1178)  point out that for 30 years 
the most highly-cited papers still lack multi-level approaches for revealing the mutual 
interdependencies between society, organization and individuals on corporate performance (for a 
quite similar critique regarding the research on entrepreneurial innovation see Autio et al (2014)). The 
need for more comprehensive explanations of innovative performance continues to challenge the field 
of institutional theory and some scholars in this field argue that an institutional perspective might 
complement resource based and industry based views e.g. Oliver (1997) and Peng et al. (2009). 
Briefly; we seek to understand why some firms are much more innovative than their competitors, 
even when parameters like industry sector, R&D expenditure, firm size etc. are similar.  
With regard to societal factors, Van Waarden (2001) investigated the influence of cultural levels of 
risk-aversion on innovative behavior, finding that with culturally-influenced risk-aversion on the 
individual level, individuals would still develop as many other innovations compared to a more risk-
friendly culture and Van Waarden (2001) concluded that in risk-adverse cultures there are not 
necessarily a lower number of innovations, but rather that risk-adverse cultures simply promote other 
types of innovations. Similarly, Tylecote (2007) argues that technological innovations need pre-
conditions including solid corporate finance and corporate governance systems and that as a 
consequence, such institutions may come to exhibit internal technological path-dependencies 
regarding innovations.  
Institution orientated approaches consider the heterogeneity of organizations: Even in a given macro-
institutional setting, intra-organizational institutions like organizational cultures, informal and formal 
incentives, routines, etc. can differ significantly, as a consequence of different adaptations within 
organizations which in turn are responses to complex challenges from within and outside the 
organization. Geels (2004) aimed to explain inertia and stability, wanting to “conceptualize the 
dynamic interplay between actors and structures” (Geels, 2004). Ahmadjian (2016, p. 25) argues in a 
similar vein; “institutions are not only a force to be resisted or adopted to, but are also, in 
complementary configurations that make up national business systems, sources of competitive 
advantage.”  
This implies that managerial capabilities should not just to bring together different resources (Mellor, 
2019), but also develop and maintain social structures and cultural flavors to create an innovative 
firm: For example Galang (2012) highlights that in corrupt societies, firms have strategies to react to 
corrupt officials and that according to organizational structures, political resources, industry 
regulation etc., firms may follow strategies ranging from fighting corruption to becoming victims (or 
bullies) in order to survive in such societies. The essentially entropic views of e.g. Dimaggio and 
Powell (1991) predict that nation-states, as enactments of the world cultural order, will drift closer 
together, although recent world events seem to indicate that political turmoil can partially reverse the 
process. Nevertheless, these findings are compatible with theories from the field of institutional 
economics and, as North (1990), North (2009) and North et al (2009) argue, successful firms adapt 
themselves to existing societal institutions. Micro-founded socio-theoretical approaches invoke two 
extremes along a spectrum; (1) open-access orders (where companies primarily address costumers’ 
needs) or (2) limited-access (where firms participate in a political rent-seeking processes) and argue 
that positioning depends on societal institutions like law, constitution and the economic order. 
According to this approach, open-access societies spark an enormous economic (and social) dynamic 
because such an institutional environment promotes competition based on merits within both markets 
and politics. On the other end of the spectrum, competition hardly works within limited-access 
societies because access to markets, resources and power is limited, rationed and sold, by the ‘rulers’. 
As a consequence, companies inhabiting limited-access societies may be less innovative because they 
have less incentive to compete for customers but rather have to spend resources to participate in rent-
seeking processes for retaining the rulers’ favour. Thus the terms open- and limited-access are clearly 
of interest to managers.  
Of course, organizations have a range of possible reactions to existing institutions e.g. passive 
tolerance, political exploitation or change them for the better. This wide variety led Greenwood et al. 
(2014) to speculate that a core challenge of institutional theory is an understanding of how 
organizations can be structured to survive in a given institutional context.  
A very powerful predictor of innovative output (Hempelmann & Engelen, 2014, Kerr & Nanda, 2015) 
is how firms make decisions regarding the financing of R&D. Indeed Kerr & Nanda (2015, p. 457) 
state that the capital structure of a firm plays a “central role in the outcome of innovativeness”. 
Important sources of financing R&D include bank finance and public capital markets (although the 
latter often causes high agency costs) financial constraints are often thought of as a serious restriction 
to the innovative capabilities of a firm. As a consequence, many governments try to address these 
constraints by subsidizing corporate R&D. The review provided by Becker (2015) summarizes recent 
findings concluding that state subsidies are ambivalent because government money may cause a 
crowding-out of private financing (it seems that this does not only hold for Europe but also for China, 
see Guan & Yam (2015)). However a less controversial finding is that state subsidies might have a 
positive effect for small firms because small firms are much more constrained regarding access to 
private finance (see also Bronzini & Iachinie, 2014, Bronzini & Piselli, 2016, Czarnitzki & Hottenrott, 
2011, as well as Ughetoo, 2008). Government grants may furthermore signal potential investors that 
this firm has a solid business model (Takalo & Tanaymama, 2010), and therefore grants could 
increase the prototyping capabilities of small firms which in turn enables more convincing 
presentations to private investors  (Howell, 2016).  
Obviously, finance and external institutions are just two facets of the whole picture and a timely and 
valuable addition includes other organizational factors relevant for corporate innovativeness (see e.g. 
Corssan & Apaydin, 2010) and indeed the study of Drechsler et al (2013) is an illustrative example 
highlighting the role of intra-organizational interdependencies on innovation. The Drechsler et al 
(2013) study revealed that the marketing department may have a positive impact on innovation if this 
department can influence R&D. Hempelman & Engelen (2014) go further and present a correlation 
between marketing and the financing of R&D, especially if the products are not very innovative. Lee 
et al (2015) highlight that innovative firms are more affected by credit rationing than non-innovative 
firms, implying that e.g. a financial crisis might have a selective effect against innovative companies.  
 
Most previous studies focus on formal IPR like patents as a metric of innovation, which in our view is 
a poor metric (see for a similar critique e.g. Kerr & Nanda, 2015, p. 457). SMEs may not patent their 
innovations or defer due to lack of capability of protecting patents. In addition, patenting focusses on 
product innovations whereas especially SMES often prefer process innovations (Piening & Salge, 
2015). As previous studies indicate, innovative behavior regarding process innovations might be quite 
different (Robin & Schubert, 2013). Therefore this study uses new tools to look at the size of the 
department in a range of firms involved in developing new products and compares this with sources 
of finance. Previous modelling (e.g. Mellor, 2014 and Mellor, 2018) has focused on SMEs partly 
because SMEs rarely possess formal intellectual property in the sense of patents, and partly due to the 
relatively tight coupling between innovation and annual performance in SMEs. To provide a cross-
cultural component we compare data from Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and 
Romania.   
 
Data and Econometric Approach 
The first data source was the IWH-FDI-micro-database (IWH, 2013). This is a dataset that includes 
around 1,200 firms in Germany and East Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia) for the year 2013, containing 36 firms with more than 1000 employees, 150 firms with 
between 250 and 1000 employees and around 1000 SMEs (with fewer than 250 employees) and 
contains data from the previous two years regarding the innovative performance, the organizational 
structure and the sources of finance for innovations in of these firms. According to IWH (2013, p. 13), 
this dataset is representative regarding the industries in this region. Table 1 and Table 2 give a short 
overview of the dataset regarding the firms’ location, industries and size.  
==================================== 
Include Tables 1 and 2 around here 
==================================== 
The second data source concerned the quality of societal institutions and came from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI, 2017) project, a research project supported by the World Bank Group 
(Table 3). This data is country-specific and includes information regarding quality of societal 
institutions like voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
control of corruption, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism. The third data source was 
provided by Eurostat (2017a, 2017b, 2017c), the statistical agency of the European Union, it contains 
(macro-) economic data (see Table 4).  
Although the countries included in our investigation countries are within the European Union, these 
six countries are quite different regarding their institutional quality and the stage of the business cycle 
they are in. The differences are remarkable; institutional quality is an illustrative example and 
according to the WGI Project (2017), Germany is around the global 10% percentile, while countries 
like Czech Republic, Poland, Slovak Republic and Hungary are around the 20% percentile whilst 
Romania is the country in the dataset with the poorest quality of institutions (30% percentile). Table 5 
illustrates that the regulatory quality indicator enables a direct comparison of different institutional 
settings across countries and cultures. Because of this, the conclusions presented here are probably 
applicable to other countries within the 10 – 30 percentile limits (and perhaps outside of these limits), 
both within and outside the European Union. We will discuss this in the final section of our paper.  
==================================== 
Include Tables 3, 4 and 5 around here 
==================================== 
Analysis of the data regarding the quality of the societal institutions shows that indicators are highly 
correlated within countries (see Table 6). This means that all parameters are aligned regarding quality. 
Briefly; countries with “poor” institutions have a low quality in all six dimensions, while countries 
with “good” institutions score highly in all dimensions. These findings are hardly surprising because 
according to the work of North (1990), North (2009) and North et al (2009) the open-access orders 
i.e. societies with a high institutional quality, achieve this because they accept civil rights, keep 
political stability and largely banish violence by using democratic process that allow unpopular 
governments to be removed, thus increasing government effectiveness and regulatory quality, by 
minimizing corruption by competition and transparency within the political system, and by 
implementing the rule of law via politically independent courts and administrations.  
==================================== 
Include Table 6 around here 
==================================== 
On the other side of the spectrum, the limited-access cultures achieve a generally poor quality 
regarding societal institutions. According to North (1990), North (2009) and North et al (2009) this 
could imply conflicts between rulers and population, and consequently firms are less productive and 
innovative because these firms have less incentives to do so, plus they might also fear expropriation 
by selfish rulers and officials.  
==================================== 
Include Table 7 around here 
==================================== 
Table 7 describes the data used. Companies are assigned binary data type with two values: true or 
false if they had any process and product innovations in the last two years. Within process innovations 
classifications are; production, logistics or internal services. The share of employees working in the 
different departments of these firms is also captured and used to understand organizational structures, 
allowing estimations like; do they have small or large R&D departments, do they employ relatively 
few or many people on a production line, are these companies more sales/marketing-driven or do we 
have companies with a large but possibly unproductive administration? There is also rather nuanced 
information regarding how companies invest in their R&D; some use internal funds, others receive 
money from shareholders and owners, while others use external sources like bank loans. Clearly 
government grants and subsidies are another possibility. In addition, the data specifies if a firm has 
spent its R&D money in-house or on external R&D, or both.  
Figure 1 summarizes the idea of our structural equation model (SEM): Previous work implies that 
societal institutions and the general economic situation can have direct effects on the innovativeness 
of firms, so if a company has had a product innovation (or any of the process innovations) then it can 
be correlated back by mediation analyses to structural, societal and financial variables. This allows the 
direct impact of society on innovativeness to be modelled as well as the mediate effects that the 
society might have on the availability of finances, how firms finance their innovations, and how firms 
adapt their organizations to reflect societal context. Furthermore the direct effects of organizational 
structure and financing on innovativeness can be estimated.  
==================================== 
Include Figure 1 around here 
==================================== 
Figure 1 shows a generalized SEM (see Rabe-Hesketh et al, 2004). This method reduces problems of 
endogeneity that might bias our findings, because the modelling is performed amongst mutual 
interdependencies between the explanatory variables on the company level and because all four types 
of innovations are estimated at the same time. This SEM was chosen firstly because this modelling 
strategy enables us to apply a probit estimation of the binary outcomes and secondly if a usual SEM 
approach would be used, then (1) our findings might be biased because ordinary regression techniques 
assume continuous outcomes, whereas here there are only two possible and ordered outcomes, and (2) 
such a regression would come up with findings that are difficult to interpret and could potentially 
even bias parameters and levels of significance. In addition, we estimate the variance and co-variance 
matrixes of our error terms in a cluster robust way to control for unobserved heterogeneity on the 
country level that might be not controlled through our explanatory variables.  
 
Findings: Process and Product Innovations follow different Institutional Logics 
The core findings of our robust generalized SEM are summed in Table 7 and highlight that different 
logics are applied by organizations regarding how they develop innovations. That, per se, is hardly 
surprising. However the data presents a more integrated perspective than hitherto on both product and 
process innovations, making it worthwhile because much research on this topic has had a strong focus 
on product innovations rather than process innovations (Piening & Salge, 2015), so the analyses 
presented here present a more integrated perspective on both product and process innovations.  
Table 8 presents the findings of the cluster robust generalized Structure Equation Model used:  
==================================== 
Include Table 8 around here 
==================================== 
The first results were aimed at illuminating correlations between product innovations and 
departmental structure, looking at the relative size of technology-related departments like IT, the 
production department and the R&D department. Only the R&D has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on the probability that a firm will come up with a product innovation. In addition, 
the relative size of the administration has a negative (and statistically significant) impact.  
Another interesting finding is that internal in-house R&D investments have a large impact, in contrast 
to external R&D investments that have on average no impact; in the case of external R&D 
investments the parameter is close to zero and it is also insignificant. There are several explanations 
for this; firms might have issues around outsourcing R&D on mission-critical innovations, or external 
actors may have difficulties in grasping the needs of the client, or even if external agencies do come 
up with good ideas, implementation fails due to employees and managers having prejudices regarding 
external ideas (Czarnitzki & Thorwarth, 2012, Grimpe & Kaiser, 2010).  
The second set of results investigated the financing of product innovations: A high proportion of 
external funds (like bank loans) and also government grants increased the probability of having a 
product innovation. Other sources of financing (including internal funds and resources from the owner 
and/or shareholders) had only a slightly positive but statistically insignificant impact. Surprisingly, the 
lack of finance for business operations in the last two years increased the probability of having a 
product innovation on a statistically significant level. The quality of the societal institutions has a 
slightly negative but statistically insignificant effect on developing product innovations. Not 
surprisingly, a positive economic development increases the probability, while inflation (used as an 
indicator for macro-economic insecurity) reduced the probability.  
The third set of results looked at process innovations and the findings underline that conclusions from 
research on product innovations cannot simply be transferred onto process innovations. Looking at 
process innovations, the R&D, the production departments and the distribution and logistics 
department are relevant. For process innovations, the size of the firm (number of employees) has a 
slightly positive impact. Compared with product innovations, in-house R&D investments have a 
positive impact but not on a statistically significant level, while external R&D investment have a 
positive but significant impact. Furthermore, the slope of the external R&D parameter for process 
innovations is much steeper than the corresponding slope obtained for product innovations. This 
indicates that external R&D works better for process innovations closely related to production.  
The fourth set of results investigated the financing of process innovations: In contrast to product 
innovations, process innovations for production rely more on money from shareholders and owners.  
Regarding the correlation between societal environments and process innovation; inflation has again a 
negative impact while the regulatory quality has a relatively strong negative impact on process 
innovations. This is quite surprising because one would have otherwise assumed that a low 
institutional quality would reduce the probability of being innovative. We will return to this surprising 
finding in the interpretation section.  
Analyzing process innovations in the firms’ logistics revealed four important empirical findings: first 
and hardly surprising, the relative share of the distribution and logistics department is highly relevant 
for developing innovations in this field. Second, firms finance these efforts through external funds 
and, third, the quality of the societal institutions has, again, a negative impact. Finally, the lack of 
finance for business operations increases the probability of achieving a process innovation.  
Regarding the development of process innovations for internal services, no special department had a 
positive or negative impact. Surprisingly, the probability of having process innovations for internal 
services is negatively linked with investments in in-house R&D and to the change in GDP. An 
interpretation of these findings is presented in the next section.  
The mediate effects that were measured by our model include that economic development as 
measured by change of GDP real, is positively linked with the number of employees in the R&D and 
IT department, as is the number of employees working for sales and marketing. Other correlations 
with economic development include (negatively) the number of employees in the producing units plus 
the potential to finance R&D through shareholders’ money and internal funds. Also, inflation has a 
slight positive impact on the number of employees in the R&D units and inflation may reduce the 
number of people in the sales and marketing just as the distribution and logistics department. In 
addition, inflation may increase the shareholder’s available money for R&D, while it marginally 
decreases internal funds. We can also see a small size effect: companies with many employees invest 
more money both in in-house and external R&D investments. About 16% of the firms in the dataset 
are larger than 250 employees, although we control for company size in our estimations, we can 
measure the effects of "bigger" firms separately and there is hardly any difference to taking the whole 
sample set, reinforcing the information IWH (2013, p. 13), that the sample of the industry of these 
countries actually is representative. SMEs dominate the dataset so we conclude that the functional 
logic of a SME is quite similar to the logic of larger companies and that even companies with 1000 
employees do not follow a completely different logic than companies with 250 employees. Indeed it 
would be surprising if abrupt changes could be seen at the 250 employee "border". As seen above, 
large companies invest marginally more money both in in-house and external R&D investments, but 
interestingly the changes between SME behaviour and large company behaviour is small and gradual, 
not abrupt. Finally, the metric ‘institutional quality’ shows a strong positive impact on the size of the 
R&D effort and size of the distribution and logistics departments in companies, but exhibits a strong 
negative impact on the number of employees in the production division and the sales and marketing 
department. This seems at fist glace to be contradictory to received wisdom that well-governed 
countries have much more productive firms, and indeed these findings will be discussed in the next 
section.  
Companies in well-governed countries seem at first to be exposed to a lower risk of lack of finance 
for business operations and these companies also spend much more money for in-house and external 
investments in R&D. In addition, well-governed countries seem to offer much higher subsidies for 
corporate R&D activities, although the effect of state finance for in-house and external investments in 
R&D, under all of the conditions tested, was zero. In addition, companies in well-governed countries 
seem to rely more strongly on external funding and less on both internal funds and investments 
through shareholders.  
In a second step, we investigated industry specific behavior (see Appendix). Initially we investigated 
the industry ‘manufacturing, repairing and installation’, which is the largest industry in our dataset - 
about 50% of the firms belong to this industry. Within this industry, firms come up with many more 
product innovations and fewer process innovations for internal services compared to the average firm 
of the dataset. Furthermore, companies within this industry have many more people employed for 
producing goods and services, while they employ fewer people within the IT-department, sales and 
marketing, distribution and logistics and within the administration. In average, this industry spends 
more money for investments on in-house and external R&D. In addition, this industry seems to have 
good access to external funds for R&D investments.  
Then we investigated the second largest industry: ‘wholesale and trade’, which accounts for around 
20% of the firms within the dataset. Firms within this industry have on average more process 
innovations in logistics and internal services. Not surprisingly, they employ fewer people in 
production and more in sales, marketing, distribution and logistics. They also have larger 
administrations. On average, they invest less in in-house and external R&D, as well as using less 
money from shareholders and governments for financing their R&D efforts. 
Interpretation and Discussion: Beyond Product Innovations and Patents 
Do societies and their institutions affect the innovative ability of corporations? Ahmadjian (2016) and 
Geels (2004) both argue that firms are quite agile and adaptive in their handling of societal 
institutions. Nevertheless, organizational capabilities could be restricted because limiting-access 
orders across a spectrum may end in the incentivization of rent-seeking behavior, which in turn results 
in fewer innovations, while open-access order incentivizes exactly the opposite, arguably to the 
advantage of the firm and the consumer. The dataset used, as illustrated by the metric "Control of 
corruption", ranges from Germany (93/100) to Romania (58/100), yet this wide range, in a global 
comparison, still represents an institutional quality of above average. It would be foolhardy to expect 
linear extrapolations beyond this range, thus our findings may not be immediately transferable to 
limited-access orders with very poor societal institutions. Nevertheless, we believe that our 
contribution is worthwhile in unveiling the impact of institutional quality – especially in a European 
context. As a natural consequence of a variety of organizational structures and institutions, there could 
be a variety of strategies that are sustainable in a given societal setting. Nonetheless the results 
presented here show that some patterns could be more successful than others regarding the innovative 
performance of firms in the European context. 
These results show that companies develop and finance process innovations quite differently to how 
they develop and finance product innovations, also under a range of societal conditions. Product 
innovations arise mainly in the R&D department, but process innovations can arise elsewhere too, and 
larger firms might have a small advantage, possibly indicating that process innovations may need a 
‘critical mass’. These findings complement the study of Robin & Schubert (2013), who reveal that 
cooperative initiatives between firms and public research institutions increase the number of product 
innovations, but not of process innovations. As our findings highlight, developing process innovations 
might require a lot of internal knowledge and single actors like R&D departments or public research 
institutions might be overwhelmed by the internal complexities of an organization. However, our 
analysis does not indicate if the size of the firm is a cause or a consequence: do larger firms become 
less efficient per capita and thus tend to develop process innovations, or does a firm need a critical 
mass of experts from different departments to come up with such innovations? Answering this 
question might be interesting for further research.  
Second, scholars like Czarnitzki & Thorwarth (2012) and Grimpe & Kaiser (2010) argue that many 
firms have issues around the implementation of innovations arising externally from the organization. 
Many scholars focus on product innovations, and our findings confirm this view for product 
innovations. However, our findings also indicate that firms can be quite successful by implementing 
external process innovations if these innovations are in the field of production. Thus, the adaptation 
and implementation of external innovations might be quite different regarding the kind of innovation. 
Analyzing these facets into detail might be another field for further research.   
One of the surprising result of the findings presented here is that relatively poor societal institutions 
(regarding the European context) increase the share of people working in the production area, which 
at first glance appears counterintuitive, but from an institutional perspective, there could be a simple 
logic: Could it be that in societies with average institutions, mass production with a high number of 
(poorly paid) workers is a suitable business model, while human capital intensive value creation 
processes are difficult to run because relatively poor societal institutions reduce the incentives for 
employers and employees to invest in firm-specific skills (Acemoglu et al., 2014, Assiotis et al., 
2015)? A consequence of this strategy would be that companies in these industries face a strong price 
competition because they cannot use product innovations for differentiation strategies. This will in 
turn increase their need to implement process innovations in production and logistics for staying 
competitive. This might explain why relatively poor institutions increase the number of process 
innovations. Understanding this better ought to be another field for further research.  
Overall the data indicates that companies in relatively poorly governed countries spend less on both 
internal and external investments in R&D. In addition, firms in such countries also have relatively 
small R&D departments. Such corporate strategies may be rational regarding the institutional 
environment; however, this may also result in lock-in effects: the gap may become wider between 
innovative firms in countries with good institutions as compared to less innovative firms in countries 
with average institutions. This might explain the observation why East Europe has established a 
highly competitive industry of suppliers and subcontractors, while many German firms, especially 
SMEs, are world-market leaders in niche markets with their innovative products. As for financing 
these innovations, the data shows that external funds seem to be the most used source for product 
innovations as well as process innovations in logistics, while funding for process innovations in 
production and internal services is achieved typically using resources derived from shareholders and 
owners.  
In addition to this general pattern, the quality of societal institutions also influences financing. 
According to our empirical findings, firms in well-governed countries have better access to 
government grants and external funds for financing their R&D investments. Conversely, firms in 
relatively poorly governed countries use internal funds and money from their shareholders. 
Confirming this different financing behavior supports the study of Lee et al (2015) who showed a 
strong negative effect of credit rationing after the financial crisis in the UK and goes further to 
intimate that the effect may only be strong in highly developed countries because firms in highly 
developed countries use well-developed capital markets more frequently for support. However, 
further research will address this finding and strive to reveal any causality behind it. 
Our dataset also reports on if companies have experienced a lack of finance for business operations in 
the last two years. Such issues have a statistically significant impact on the number of product 
innovations and process innovations in logistics. Surprisingly, considering the sign of the slopes, 
firms often become more innovative when they have to handle a lack of finance for business 
operations, and one can speculate that necessity incentivizes being innovative. However, these 
findings can also be explained as the result of a survival bias: a lack of finance exerts a force on all 
companies, but only the survivors reported on this because only they could create adequate 
innovations to compensate for the lack of finance.  
Finally, our findings reveal that different industries follow different innovation strategies. Not 
surprisingly, manufacturers have stronger focus on product innovations and hardly implement process 
innovations for internal services, while wholesalers and traders encourage process innovations for 
logistics and internal services. According to Kerr & Nanda (2015) and Piening & Salge (2015), 
previous empirical research in the field of innovation management had a primary focus on product 
innovations using patents as a metric for being innovative. We criticize this approach because most 
process innovations are not represented by patents, and the findings reported here show that industries 
that focus on process innovations follow different patterns of developing and financing innovations. 
The quality of country institutions is possibly correlated to other characteristics of the economic 
structure of a country which affect innovations, thus the relationship between institutions and 
innovation can be affected by other factors omitted from the analysis, nonetheless we urge caution 
when applying findings from product innovations and manufacturers to other types of innovation and 
other sectors, in countries with differing quality of societal institutions.  
 
Conclusion: Institutions as a central factor for explaining innovative performance 
These findings enrich the theoretical discussion how societal institutions, financing and the 
innovativeness of firms are linked. Furthermore the results have far-reaching implications for 
managerial practice and management education. From the perspective of innovation management, 
managers have to decide how many resources to invest in process or product innovations. Our 
findings reveal that this decision should not only be considered by the availability of financial and 
human resources, because societal institutions could have a far-reaching impact on if product or 
process innovations are appropriate for achieving economic sustainability. Even if employees propose 
innovations and even if resources were available, managers might have decide against implementing 
innovations because, in the case of limiting-access orders, these innovations could conflict with 
societal norms and in such an environment it might be counter-productive to increase the number of 
product innovations and improve corporate performance (because high profits presumably attract 
corrupt officials and politicians).  
As a consequence, choosing the right innovative strategies is not only a question that considers human 
and financial resources; it is also a decision that has to consider the given societal context. This is also 
true vice versa, as Pies et al (2009) argue, managers can also influence societal institutions and help 
overcome societal deficits to promote innovations and this might be true in limited-access societies 
and especially prominent in societies that are undergoing the transformations process into open-access 
societies, as indeed some countries in our sample are striving to do.  
We have a European “bias” in our dataset and further research might reveal additional or different 
patterns in other (non-European) regions. If so, then panel studies could be used to analyze changes 
over time and add more links between innovations and financial performances in regard to societal 
institutions 
A tipping point may exist where institutional quality affects whether companies are innovative at all: 
The countries of our dataset cover the first third of all nations but these findings do not of necessity 
have to be transferable to the other two thirds. Nonetheless it remains open as to whether the effects of 
societal institutions are linear within the range investigated, or if there is a tipping point on the scale 
(also outside of the limits investigated here) at which firms in a country may drift away from a 
process innovation strategy to follow a more product innovation strategy as the societal institutions 
improve (or vice versa if the quality is decreasing). 
Ultimately, a future perspective includes that a stronger micro-foundation could conceivably be useful 
to elucidate how institutions frame and constrain the decisions of managers and employees regarding 
their innovative behavior. We believe that such research will further develop innovation management, 
not only for academic ends, but will also have powerful practical applications.   
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Table 1: Industries 
  CZ DE HU PL RO SK Total 
Attribution missing 3 1 0 0 0 0 4 
Mining 1 3 1 2 1 1 9 
Manufacturing, Reparing and Installation 149 184 57 91 91 46 618 
Electricity, Gas, Water, Sewerage, Waste 6 30 4 11 3 2 56 
Wholesale and trade 52 50 23 65 27 12 229 
Transport, warehousing and postal services 12 12 5 21 10 6 66 
Publishing, TV, Radio 5 4 1 3 2 0 15 
Telecommunication, programming and IT 6 18 4 2 15 2 47 
Finance, insurance and real estate 5 10 8 6 4 3 36 
Legal and Accounting 3 14 2 2 4 0 25 
Architectural and engineering activities, research and 
development 21 40 11 9 10 6 97 
Total 263 366 116 212 167 78 1202 
Source: IWH (2013) 
 
Table 2: Firm Size 
Number of Employees CZ DE HU PL RO SK All 
Min 15 1 10 10 10 15 1 
Max 2.750 37.000 11.653 3.000 2.688 1.500 37.000 
Mean 197 202 497 175 170 186 219 
Median 75 34 87 60 45 100 51 
Std. Dev.  351 1.947 1.640 359 399 248 1.225 
Number of SMEs (Number of Emp. < 250) 212 335 87 175 143 60 1012 
Bigger Firms (Number of Emp. >= 250) 51 31 29 37 24 18 190 
 
Source: IWH (2013) 
 











Rule of Law 
Control of 
Corruption 
CZ 0.966159761 1.05212009 0.887555599 1.090325832 1.01224041 0.193954825 
DE 1.418123722 0.928079724 1.530369759 1.556691051 1.626392126 1.790085435 
HU 0.739539862 0.779447079 0.655329764 0.89416188 0.572680831 0.291925371 
PL 0.981403828 0.960940003 0.719274938 1.052919269 0.794941187 0.553665996 
RO 0.296449721 0.164314687 -0.062753692 0.606307864 0.114980102 -0.184331402 
SK 0.944553137 1.099374533 0.788209677 0.922895908 0.455329895 0.061339367 
Note: The indicators range from -2.5 (very poor) to 2.5 (very good), Source: Worldwide Governance 










CZ -0.9 1.4 
DE 0.5 1.6 
HU 0.2 1.9 
PL 1.3 1.0 
RO 3.5 3.2 
SK 0.8 17.0 
Sources: Eurostat (2017a, b, c) 
 
Table 5: Regulatory Quality as an Indicator for Institutional Quality 
Country/Territory Rank 
 
Percentile Value Country/Territory Rank 
 
Percentile Value Country/Territory Rank 
 
Percentile Value 
SINGAPORE 1 0% 1.98 LITHUANIA 34 16% 1.15 URUGUAY 67 32% 0.54 
HONG KONG 
SAR, CH. 2 1% 1.94 
CAYMAN 
ISLANDS 35 17% 1.12 BULGARIA 68 32% 0.53 
SWEDEN 3 1% 1.90 ICELAND 36 17% 1.12 OMAN 69 33% 0.48 
FINLAND 4 2% 1.86 JAPAN 37 17% 1.11 MEXICO 70 33% 0.47 
NEW ZEALAND 5 2% 1.83 
BRUNEI 
DARUSSALAM 38 18% 1.11 PERU 71 33% 0.47 
DENMARK 6 3% 1.81 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 39 18% 1.09 CROATIA 72 34% 0.45 
AUSTRALIA 7 3% 1.80 RÉUNION 40 19% 1.08 BARBADOS 73 34% 0.44 
LUXEMBOURG 8 4% 1.78 POLAND 41 19% 1.05 TURKEY 74 35% 0.44 
NETHERLANDS 9 4% 1.78 LATVIA 42 20% 1.04 SOUTH AFRICA 75 35% 0.42 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 10 5% 1.77 KOREA, REP. 43 20% 0.99 
ST. KITTS AND 
NEVIS 76 36% 0.41 
CANADA 11 5% 1.73 MAURITIUS 44 21% 0.94 COLOMBIA 77 36% 0.41 
NORWAY 12 6% 1.66 SPAIN 45 21% 0.94 
AMERICAN 
SAMOA 78 37% 0.37 
SWITZERLAND 13 6% 1.64 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 46 22% 0.92 PANAMA 79 37% 0.36 
IRELAND 14 7% 1.58 CYPRUS 47 22% 0.92 MACEDONIA, FYR 80 38% 0.33 
LIECHTENSTEIN 15 7% 1.57 HUNGARY 48 23% 0.89 
ST. VINCENT AND 
THE G. 81 38% 0.32 
ANDORRA 16 8% 1.56 PUERTO RICO 49 23% 0.85 EL SALVADOR 82 39% 0.32 
GERMANY 17 8% 1.56 MARTINIQUE 50 24% 0.85 ST. LUCIA 83 39% 0.29 
CHILE 18 8% 1.49 
NETHERLANDS 
ANTILLES 51 24% 0.85 DOMINICA 84 40% 0.28 
AUSTRIA 19 9% 1.49 PORTUGAL 52 25% 0.80 GRENADA 85 40% 0.28 
ARUBA 20 9% 1.45 
UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES 53 25% 0.79 
TRINIDAD AND 
TOBAGO 86 41% 0.26 
ESTONIA 21 10% 1.44 ITALY 54 25% 0.78 ARMENIA 87 41% 0.25 
GREENLAND 22 10% 1.41 QATAR 55 26% 0.75 JAMAICA 88 42% 0.24 
MACAO SAR, 
CHINA 23 11% 1.34 GEORGIA 56 26% 0.75 THAILAND 89 42% 0.23 
ANGUILLA 24 11% 1.32 MALAYSIA 57 27% 0.65 ALBANIA 90 42% 0.21 
BERMUDA 25 12% 1.32 GREECE 58 27% 0.62 BAHAMAS, THE 91 43% 0.17 
FRENCH GUIANA 26 12% 1.31 SLOVENIA 59 28% 0.62 
WEST BANK AND 
GAZA 92 43% 0.16 
MALTA 27 13% 1.30 BAHRAIN 60 28% 0.61 JORDAN 93 44% 0.13 
BELGIUM 28 13% 1.30 
ANTIGUA AND 
BARBUDA 61 29% 0.61 SAUDI ARABIA 94 44% 0.09 
UNITED STATES 29 14% 1.26 GUAM 62 29% 0.61 NAMIBIA 95 45% 0.09 
JERSEY, 
CHANNEL I. 30 14% 1.20 
VIRGIN ISLANDS 
(U.S.) 63 30% 0.61 GHANA 96 45% 0.08 
FRANCE 31 15% 1.16 ROMANIA 64 30% 0.61 BRAZIL 97 46% 0.08 
ISRAEL 32 15% 1.16 COSTA RICA 65 31% 0.59 MONTENEGRO 98 46% 0.06 
TAIWAN, CHINA 33 16% 1.15 BOTSWANA 66 31% 0.58 RWANDA 99 47% 0.02 
                KOSOVO 100 47% -0.03 
Note: The tTop 100 countries according to the regulatory quality, total number of countries: 215, 
highest value: 2.5, lowest value: -2.5, Own calculations, Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) Project (2017) 
 
 

















1            
Political Stability 
and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
 0.7354 * 1          
Government 
Effectiveness  
0.9874 * 0.6957 * 1        
Regulatory Quality  0.9776 * 0.5956 * 0.983 * 1      
Rule of Law  0.9585 * 0.6003 * 0.9715 * 0.9902 * 1    
Control of 
Corruption  
0.8901 * 0.3553 * 0.8976 * 0.9474 * 0.9131 * 1  
 
Own calculations, Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project (2017) 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics 
  Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Product Innovations in the Last Two Years 1177 0.57 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Process Innovations Producing in the Last Two Years 1184 0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Process Innovations Logistics in the Last Two Years 1183 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Process Innovations Internal Services in the Last Two Years 1186 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Lack of Finance for Business Operations in the Last Two 
Years 1178 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Investments in Inhouse R&D 1159 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Investments in External R&D 1170 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
% of Employees Producing Goods and Services 1169 57.05 32.19 0.00 100.00 
% of Employees working for Distribution and Logistics 1169 10.58 16.55 0.00 100.00 
% of Employees working for Sales and Marketing 1169 9.85 16.89 0.00 100.00 
% of Employees working in the IT Department 1169 2.86 8.77 0.00 100.00 
% of Employees working as Administrators/Managers 1169 10.97 12.71 0.00 100.00 
% of Employees working for R&D 1169 5.08 12.36 0.00 100.00 
% of Employee in other Functions 1169 3.70 11.27 0.00 100.00 
Share of R&D Investments through Internal Funds 831 70.34 39.45 0.00 100.00 
Share of R&D Investments through Shareholders 831 12.48 29.51 0.00 100.00 
Share of R&D Investments through External Funds 833 5.99 19.11 0.00 100.00 
Share of R&D Investments through Government Grants  835 4.47 13.39 0.00 100.00 
Regulatory Quality 1202 1.13 0.32 0.61 1.56 
Change of GDP real 1202 0.74 1.32 -0.90 3.50 
Inflation 1202 2.70 3.82 1.00 17.00 
Own calculations, Sources: Eurostat (2017a, b, c), IWH (2013), Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) Project (2017) 
 
 
Table 8: Findings of the Generalized Structure Equitation Model 








Producing in the 










the Last Two 
Years 
        
    
% of Employees working 
for R&D 0.0045205 * 0.0126754 ** 0.0027375   
-
0.0025264               
% of Employees working 
in the IT Department 0.0079471   0.0044621   0.0004166   
-
0.0037724               
% of Employees working 
for Sales and Marketing 0.0038196   0.0041692   0.0046488   
-
0.0037303               
% of Employees working 
for Distribution and 
Logistics 
-
0.0021877   0.0053924 ** 0.0211424 *** 0.0007657               
% of Employees 
Producing Goods and 
Services 
-
0.0019025   0.0126406 ** 0.0035259   
-
0.0016638               
Number of Employees 0.0001469   0.0000742 *** 0.0001097 * 0.0002769 ***             
% of Employees working 
as 
Administrators/Managers -0.010438 * 
-
0.0022446   0.0048235   0.0038975               
Lack of Finance for 
Business Operations in 
the Last Two Years 0.1576039 *** 
-
0.0405701   0.1746165 * -0.026236               
Investments in Inhouse 
R&D 0.6492888 *** 0.2139422   0.0691015   
-
0.2384235 ***             
Investments in External 
R&D 0.0415189   0.1693248 ** 0.1577655   
-
0.0145263               
Share of R&D 
Investments through 
Internal Funds 0.0008516   0.0037704   0.0027812   0.0027764               
Share of R&D 
Investments through 
Shareholders 0.0016504   0.0050329 ** 0.0037926   0.0055613               
Share of R&D 
Investments through 
External Funds 0.007149 * 0.0014426   0.0071977 *** 0.0041015               
Share of R&D 
Investments through 
Government Grants  0.0079736 ** 0.0044962   0.0011805   
-
0.0041501 *             















0.0169028 *** 0.0019886               
Constant 0.3178887   
-
0.5864533   
-
0.9856893 ** 0.1577317               
  
% of Employees 
working for 
R&D 
% of Employees 
working in the 
IT Department 












% of Employees working 
as 
Administrators/Managers 
    
Number of Employees 0.0002415   
-
0.0000588   
-
0.0004828   
-
0.0003477 ** 0.0006961   -0.0003027       
Change of GDP real 0.6183956 *** 0.4988354 *** 0.355447   0.0163851   -1.915181 ** 0.5559726       
Regulatory Quality 9.060983 *** 0.9886462 ** -3.67537 * 3.121621 *** -10.06075 *** 0.7036125       




0.1664233 *** 0.0348941   -0.0863146       
Constant -6.425321 *** 1.26143 ** 14.96912 *** 7.538535 *** 69.5918 *** 10.05918 ***     
  
Lack of Finance 
for Business 
Operations in 














Share of R&D 
Investments through 
External Funds 





Number of Employees -0.000011 ** 0.0000364 * 0.0000357 ** 0.0006314   
-
0.0002819   -0.0000177   0.0002858   
Change of GDP real 0.0516324 *** 0.0147726 * 0.01579 * 
-
0.3470542 ** -1.884422 *** 0.312943   0.009299   
Regulatory Quality 0.0189948   0.2710484 *** 0.1652953 *** -5.313884 *** -3.685608 *** 3.29015 *** 7.971051 *** 
Inflation 
-




0.0944826 *** 0.3410939 *** -0.0202303   0.0099763   
Constant 0.1012811 * 0.1000401 ** 0.1507025 *** 76.48501 *** 17.51427 *** 1.867077   -5.379127 *** 
 
Own calculations, Sources: Eurostat (2017a, b, c), IWH (2013), Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) Project (2017) 
 
Figure 1: Overview of the Generalized Structure Equitation Model 
 
Own illustration.  
 
 











Producing in the 
Last Two Years 
Process 
Innovations 
Logistics in the 




Services in the 
Last Two Years 
        
    
% of Employees working 
for R&D 0.00441 * 0.0123815 ** 0.0023073   
-
0.0031742               
% of Employees working 
in the IT Department 0.0092327   0.0049507   
-
0.0005882   
-
0.0066518               
% of Employees working 
for Sales and Marketing 0.0044762   0.0042382   0.0037234   
-
0.0060374               
% of Employees working 
for Distribution and 
Logistics 
-
0.0021548   0.0048779 ** 0.0203559 *** -0.000307               
% of Employees 
Producing Goods and 
Services 
-
0.0031505   0.0118077 ** 0.0035104   
-
0.0013295               
Manufacturing, Reparing 
and Installation 0.2714621 *** 0.123999   
-
0.0665366   
-
0.2463128 ***             






0.0026062   0.0042542   0.0015197               
Lack of Finance for 
Business Operations in 
the Last Two Years 0.1409645 ** -0.047186   0.1560435   
-
0.0526273               
Investments in Inhouse 
R&D 0.6256385 *** 0.194037   0.0977694   
-
0.2004283 **             
Investments in External 
R&D 0.0376872   0.1672421 *** 0.1670375   0.0227015               
Share of R&D 
Investments through 
Internal Funds 0.0007063   0.0037507   0.0028904   0.0031795               
Share of R&D 
Investments through 
Shareholders 0.0013109   0.0048912 ** 0.0038481   0.0060477 *             
Share of R&D 
Investments through 
External Funds 0.0066037 * 0.0012355   0.0073788 *** 0.0050252               
Share of R&D 
Investments through 
Government Grants  0.0080826 ** 0.0046921   0.0013455   
-
0.0038777 *             
Change of GDP real 0.1106592 ** 0.0118867   0.0310434 * 
-
0.0824133 ***             
Regulatory Quality 
-











0.0179861 *** 0.0008008               
Constant 0.2941974   -0.557467   
-
0.8593796 ** 0.4318596               
  
% of Employees 
working for 
R&D 
% of Employees 
working in the 
IT Department 












% of Employees working 
as 
Administrators/Managers 




0.1959745   -2.747014 *** -9.925694 *** -5.846119 *** 23.60843 *** -4.48653 ***     
Change of GDP real 0.6189487 *** 0.456677 *** 0.2297484   
-
0.0396142   -1.615611 ** 0.5029555       
Regulatory Quality 9.063598 *** 0.8563398   -4.02188 *** 3.079682 *** -9.356954 *** 0.5776449       






0.1387164 * -0.0530138       
Constant -6.287345 *** 2.787539 *** 20.25941 *** 10.47041 *** 57.01094 *** 12.40052 ***     
  
Lack of Finance 
for Business 
Operations in 














Share of R&D 
Investments through 
External Funds 





Number of Employees     0.0000298   0.0000316 **                 
Manufacturing, Reparing 
and Installation 0.0069067   0.1746393 *** 0.133111 *** 
-
0.3608399   1.865652   3.557112 ** 0.2542456   
Change of GDP real 0.0522158 *** 0.01735 *** 0.0180382 * 
-
0.4720121 *** -1.765838 *** 0.4105088 ** 0.004139   
Regulatory Quality 0.0202884   0.2783192 *** 0.170863 *** -5.567561 *** -3.304874 *** 3.578648 *** 7.913006 *** 
Inflation 
-




0.1043638 *** 0.344284 *** -0.0264886   0.0050964   
Constant 0.0930846 * 0.0034858   0.0767178 ** 77.34095 *** 15.89793 *** -0.4202667   -5.359682 *** 
 
Own calculations, Sources: Eurostat (2017a, b, c), IWH (2013), Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) Project (2017) 
APPENDIX 2: Generalized SEM: Wholesale and Trade 
                              









Producing in the 
Last Two Years 
Process 
Innovations 
Logistics in the 




Services in the 
Last Two Years 
        
    
% of Employees working 
for R&D 0.0040712 * 0.0123694 ** 0.0032643   
-
0.0023197               
% of Employees working 
in the IT Department 0.0073573   0.0040397   0.000996   
-
0.0039575               
% of Employees working 
for Sales and Marketing 0.002817   0.0031438   0.0012209   
-
0.0070302               
% of Employees working 
for Distribution and 
Logistics 
-
0.0025558   0.0045283 * 0.0194594 *** 
-
0.0009642               
% of Employees 
Producing Goods and 
Services 
-
0.0023804   0.0122489 ** 0.0044395   
-
0.0014338               
Wholesale, Trade 0.0170399   0.0486108   0.3770385 *** 0.2787328 **             






0.0032394   0.0047424   0.0024958               
Lack of Finance for 
Business Operations in 
the Last Two Years 0.1442808 ** 
-
0.0467423   0.1620497 * 
-
0.0484215               
Investments in Inhouse 
R&D 0.6483699 *** 0.2108967   0.1094588   
-
0.2175879 ***             
Investments in External 
R&D 0.0561345   0.1766648 *** 0.1627487   0.0036679               
Share of R&D 
Investments through 
Internal Funds 0.0010061   0.0038587   0.0032114   0.0032084               
Share of R&D 
Investments through 
Shareholders 0.0018042   0.0051027 ** 0.0043522   0.006041 *             
Share of R&D 
Investments through 
External Funds 0.0072761 * 0.0015705   0.0076585 *** 0.0046227               
Share of R&D 
Investments through 
Government Grants  0.0081724 ** 0.0047225   0.001961   
-
0.0034907               
Change of GDP real 0.1082763 ** 0.0106963   0.0364513 * 
-
0.0783807 ***             
Regulatory Quality 
-













0.0166749 *** 0.0012124               
Constant 0.4027644   
-
0.5159048   -1.08536 *** 0.2154101               
  
% of Employees 
working for 
R&D 
% of Employees 
working in the 
IT Department 












% of Employees working 
as 
Administrators/Managers 
    
Wholesale, Trade -1.835132 *** 
-
0.1968484   19.25834 *** 12.67883 *** -34.33542 *** 3.941058 ***     
Change of GDP real 0.6077754 *** 0.5027949 *** 0.5549874   0.1625577 * -2.298094 *** 0.6121312       
Regulatory Quality 8.906056 *** 0.9753694 ** -1.771105   4.52716 *** -13.66463 *** 1.160679       






0.1967912   -0.0588472       
Constant -5.816715 *** 1.294076 * 8.533982 *** 3.14087 *** 81.26451 *** 8.61037 ***     
  
Lack of Finance 
for Business 
Operations in 














Share of R&D 
Investments through 
External Funds 





Number of Employees     0.0000316 * 0.0000341 **                 
Wholesale, Trade 
-






0.7798945   -3.124685 * -1.34081   -2.258792 *** 
Change of GDP real 0.0518754 *** 0.012869 ** 0.0152516   - *** -1.812953 *** 0.3225356   -   
0.4705143 0.0031424 
Regulatory Quality 0.0177533   0.2555413 *** 0.1597901 *** -5.595367 *** -3.696955 *** 3.191988 *** 7.760907 *** 
Inflation 
-
0.0044331 * 0.005596 *** 
-
0.0044688 *** -0.108923 * 0.3212135 *** -0.0284554   -0.005663   
Constant 0.1045679 * 0.1512846 *** 0.1693731 *** 77.33489 *** 18.01168 *** 2.221952   -4.608524 *** 
 
Own calculations, Sources: Eurostat (2017a, b, c), IWH (2013), Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) Project (2017) 
